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In many Internet commerce applications buyers can easily achieve anonymity, limiting
what a seller can learn about any buyer individually. However, because sellers need to keep a
fixed web address, buyers can probe them repeatedly or pool their information about sellers
with the information obtained by other buyers; hence, sellers’ strategies become public
knowledge. Under assumptions of buyer anonymity, publicly-known seller strategies, and
no negotiation transaction costs for buyers, we find that take-it-or-leave-it offers will yield
at least as much seller profit as any attempt at price discrimination could yield. As we relax
those assumptions, however, we find that sellers, and in some cases buyers as well, may
benefit from a more general bargaining protocol.
1. Introduction
Because it is so easy to gather personal information during electronic inter-
actions, there has been increasing concern about the privacy implications of the
World Wide Web and of electronic commerce conducted using the Web. For ex-
ample, when we provide demographic information to a Web site, will it be sold
to direct marketers? Or, perhaps more disturbingly, if our browsing behavior can
be captured and analyzed, will health insurers raise premiums or refuse coverage
for people who retrieve information about certain illnesses that are costly to treat?
One principle of fair information practices is that consumers should receive no-
tice about what information is being collected and how it will be used, and have
a choice about whether to interact on those terms [7]. When browsing, however,
people do not want constant interruptions that require them to read the fine print
of privacy notices and click to indicate that they accept those terms and condi-
tions.
The Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P), under development by the
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C, 1998), is designed to allow negotiations over
privacy terms and conditions to take place in the background without constant user
 Baltzer Science Publishers BV
2 L.F. Cranor, P. Resnick / Protocols for automated negotiations
intervention. Users should be able to enter their privacy preferences once and have
their software act accordingly. For example, some people may be willing to share
their address and phone number with Web sites that promise to use it only for order
fulfillment. At each Web site these people visit, their software would negotiate in the
background with software running on the site, divulging the information only if the
Web site agrees to this limitation on its use. Outside the scope of P3P, two automated
agents – one representing the user and the other the Web site – might also negotiate
prices or terms and conditions for a good or the use of a piece of intellectual property.
For example, negotiations may lead to agreements in which a Web site allows a piece
of music to be downloaded by a browser that promises to play the music only once
and then discard it [11].
Throughout this paper we shall refer to Web sites as sellers and Web browsers
(and the people who use them) as buyers. In our examples, the seller will generally
offer some content or service in exchange for some combination of money and the
right to use personal information for specified purposes. While it certainly may be
viewed from the opposite perspective as well, we view the content or service as
the good being sold and the money and personal information as the currency of the
transaction.
What bargaining protocol should the agents use in their negotiations? A bargain-
ing protocol determines when players can make offers and the structure of offers. In
its most general form, negotiation involves one or more rounds of offers that are either
accepted or rejected. The particular rules governing the sequence of offers, however,
can vary. The parties may alternate offers and counter-offers, or one party may make
all the offers, or anything in between. It may be required that an offer, once made,
not later be withdrawn, or offers may be valid only if accepted within a specified time
period or before the end of the round in which the offer was made.
The protocol for a particular negotiation or limitations on the validity of an
offer may not be enforceable without external mechanisms such as legal statutes.
Such rules may none-the-less be credible when announced by a negotiator who has
established a reputation for following a particular set of rules. For example, cus-
tomers of most car dealers are unlikely to believe an announcement that the first
offer is the best and final offer, because car dealers are known to haggle with their
customers. On the other hand, some car dealers have established a reputation for
offering a fixed price.1 At such dealerships customers understand that the dealer’s
first offer is his final offer; the dealer will not make a second offer for fear of tar-
nishing his reputation. Negotiation rules more complicated than those in the above
example may prove even more difficult to enforce in the absence of external mecha-
nisms.
In an automated negotiation, the software implementation of the automated pro-
tocol itself may enforce some restrictions on player actions. For example, the protocol
1 The Saturn corporation has invested in advertising in order to develop a reputation that its dealers will
not haggle over price.
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can bar one or both players from making counter-offers in certain situations. We assume
that any communication not specified within the bounds of the agreed-upon protocol
will be completely ignored by the agents. Such restrictions would be implausible in
live negotiations.2
While automated negotiations allow for credible restrictions that may shorten or
simplify negotiation, they also allow for negotiations in which complicated strategies
are used. In some negotiations, the optimal strategy for one or both of the players
involves contingencies or randomization that would be difficult for most people to
discover and execute. However, computerized agents might be programmed to exe-
cute the optimal strategy for every negotiation, regardless of the complexity of that
strategy.
In addition, computerized agents can discover and execute strategies and commu-
nicate offers much more quickly than humans can. Thus the delay costs from multiple
rounds of negotiation will normally be negligible. However, when delay costs place
unequal burdens on the parties to a negotiation, the optimal strategy for one party may
involve creating a deliberate delay that creates significant costs.
In this paper we consider questions of two kinds. First, given a negotiation
protocol (the rules that govern offer sequences), what strategies are optimal for players
to adopt? Second, given an analysis of players’ optimal strategies under various rules,
how should a social planner design a negotiation protocol?
The Web negotiation situation has three peculiar properties that we will explore:
• First, the browser (buyer) may have some degree of anonymity, while the Web site
does not. The browser may be able to conceal its identity or use a pseudonym,
while the Web site’s address is public. Thus, the Web site is somewhat analogous
to an identified store, which buyers can enter or leave at will. One implication of
this difference in anonymity is that buyers may be able to pool information about a
seller’s negotiating strategy. Interestingly, a buyer who chooses to reveal its identity
can also make its past negotiating strategies with other sellers visible to the current
seller; a buyer who develops a reputation as a hard bargainer may benefit from
revealing its identity.
• Second, only the browser can initiate an interaction. This is a basic feature of the
HTTP communication protocol that governs interactions between browsers and Web
sites. With the advent of “push” technology, this asymmetry between browser and
web site is eroding, but many transactions of the type we envision will be based
on the more conventional “pull” technology. One implication is that if a buyer
ends a negotiation, the seller may have no way of contacting the buyer to make
an additional offer. If the seller cuts off a negotiation, however, the buyer can still
make additional offers, and it may be irrational for the seller to refuse to consider
such offers.
2 For example, in a live negotiation a player who makes an offer and says he will refuse even to listen
to any counter-offer has a hard time making that threat believable.
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• Third, a buyer may be able to restart a negotiation under a new pseudonym without
the Web site being able to detect this. This gives a buyer another potential informa-
tional asymmetry, even if the buyers do not pool their information about a seller’s
negotiating strategy. A buyer who returns under a different pseudonym still retains
its knowledge of the seller’s behavior in the prior negotiation.
The ability of automated agents to recognize and execute complicated strategies
will be limited if their underlying programs are unsophisticated. Indeed, programming
an agent to behave optimally in a wide range of negotiation situations is a non-trivial
problem. This problem may be simplified for negotiation protocols that bound the
number of rounds of offers, especially if only one or two rounds are permitted. The
optimal strategies will be easier for people to recognize – and, in turn, program au-
tomated agents to recognize and execute – and, hence, there will be less danger of
players adopting irrational strategies. That, in turn, makes it safer for players to assume
rational opponents when choosing their own strategies.
Limited protocols such as a take-it-or-leave-it offer in the first round are espe-
cially easy to implement. Ease of implementation may, in turn, spur faster adoption.
In addition, in some cases, restricting the number of rounds in the protocol may
focus players on more socially efficient outcomes. Thus, we pay special attention
to those situations where all parties benefit at least as much from a limited proto-
col as they do from a protocol with unbounded rounds. For protocols like P3P that
are motivated in part by a desire to empower consumers, situations in which the
buyer benefits at least as much from the limited protocol may be acceptable, even
if the seller might benefit more from the unbounded protocol under some circum-
stances.
Besides ease of implementation, limited protocols may sometimes be desirable
because they restrict the amount of time it may take to complete the negotiation.
Although computerized agents allow each round of negotiation to be executed quickly,
negotiations can take a significant amount of time if they persist for many rounds
(and indeed they may sometimes proceed indefinitely unless one of the agents is
programmed to end the negotiation after a fixed number of rounds or after a certain
amount of time has passed without reaching an agreement). Time considerations are
most significant when the negotiation occurs while users are waiting.
In the next section we describe three assumptions – buyer anonymity, publicly-
known seller strategies, and no buyer transaction costs – and show that a restricted
protocol will yield the same equilibrium outcomes as a more complicated protocol
when these assumptions hold. Arguably, our three assumptions do not always hold
in the bargaining situations of interest. If we could prove the same result when these
assumptions were relaxed, then designers of P3P and similar systems would be well
advised to adopt restricted protocols. However, as we relax these assumptions, we
find that sellers, and in some cases buyers as well, may benefit from a more general
bargaining protocol. In the sections that follow we consider these results and what
they mean for protocol designers.
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2. Modeling
A seller faces an infinite sequence of buyers {b1, b2, . . .}. Each buyer bi has a type
defined by a reservation value vi, and sometimes a delay or transaction cost ki per round
of negotiation. The buyer types are drawn from independent, identically distributed
random variables having distribution B. The seller adopts a strategy S = {Si}, where
Si defines the negotiation strategy employed with buyer bi. Si may consist of an
initial offer, responses to potential counter-offers, planned further counter-offers, etc.
Moreover, any of these plans may involve randomization. Si may be contingent on
the outcome of previous negotiation sessions. For example, the seller may want to
experiment with various strategies in order to obtain information about the distribution
of buyer types or, when individual buyers’ histories are available, about a particular
buyer’s strategy. We will mostly be concerned, however, with the steady state strategy
of the seller, after any initial learning period.
For simplicity, we initially analyze the protocols as if the negotiation concerned
prices rather than personal data to be revealed or other transaction terms. One limitation
of this modeling choice is that prices are normally continuous, while only a few
discrete values may be possible for other terms and conditions. This difference between
connected and unconnected agreement sets can be important (see, for example, Osborne
and Rubenstein [8, section 3.10]), but none of our results depend on an assumption of
connected agreement sets.
A more serious limitation of modeling trade in terms of money rather than data
is that personal data may be more valuable to some buyers than others. To rectify this,
we sometimes include in a buyer’s type a positive linear utility function ui defined over
the unit of trade. Note that we introduce the utility function not for its usual purposes
of modeling risk aversion or wealth effects but merely because our unit of trade may
be data rather than money. Thus, positive linear utility functions are sufficient for our
goal of allowing buyer types to have different utilities for personal data. If some buyer
types are truly indifferent about release of their personal data, they will be willing to
reveal data even if an agreement can be reached with less data revelation. This suggests
that the P3P protocol should always include the option for users to reveal additional
personal data,3 but we consider that as an action outside of the negotiation process.
For the remainder of this paper, we assume that all buyer types have some positive
valuation for personal data, even if it is very small.
3. Cases
Our analysis begins with a simplified case, in which buyers have full anonymity,
full knowledge of the seller’s strategy, and no transaction costs. Not surprisingly, the
3 This might be implemented in a protocol by allowing agreements to be reached in which transferring
certain data elements is optional. Thus, a buyer’s agent might reach the optimal agreement involving
the minimum amount of data revelation acceptable to the Web site, but an indifferent buyer can send
all or some of the optional data as well.
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seller has little bargaining power in this situation, and can do no better than to make
take-it-or-leave-it offers in the first round. Under these assumptions, a protocol that
permits only one round of negotiation offers rational players the same outcome as a
more general protocol, and eliminates the need to consider irrational strategies on the
part of opponents. The remaining sub-sections relax each of the assumptions in turn.
In some cases, the main result still holds, while in others the seller and/or some of the
buyers may prefer a more complicated protocol.
3.1. Base case
We begin our discussion by exploring a simplified case based on three assump-
tions. We will show that these are reasonable assumptions in some situations, and that
when these assumptions hold the optimal strategy for the seller is a take-it-or-leave-it
offer.
Assumption 1 (The buyer is anonymous). Individuals who wish to browse the web
anonymously can take advantage of a variety of tools and techniques that offer varying
degrees of anonymity or pseudonymity. Pseudonymous relationships with Web sites
can be established by offering a pseudonym rather than one’s real name when prompted
to register at a site [3]. By offering a different pseudonym at each site, individuals can
thwart sites’ attempts to compile profiles based on information collected by multiple
sites. However, every time the individual returns to the same site, that site will
recognize them by their pseudonym. Cookies and other persistent state technologies
[5,6] can also allow sites to recognize repeat visitors, even those that have not registered
with the site. To prevent sites from recognizing them as repeat visitors, individuals
can install software on their computers that prevents the use of cookies and masks all
identifying information except IP address. For even greater anonymity they can use an
anonymizing proxy server [1,9] that hides all browser information. Thus, individuals
who wish to browse anonymously have the opportunity to do so.
The ability of buyers to be anonymous has two important implications for online
negotiations. First, it prevents the seller from taking advantage of any historic infor-
mation it may have on the buyer. The seller is unable to determine that a particular
buyer is one it does business with frequently, one that has a reputation for accepting
high offers, or one known for driving hard bargains. Second, it prevents the seller
from distinguishing buyers who are initiating new negotiations from those restarting
a recent negotiation. Thus, the seller has no way of knowing if the present buyer is
the one who walked away five minutes ago without reaching an agreement, or a new
buyer with whom there has been no negotiation. As a result, buyers can come and
go at will, returning repeatedly to probe the seller’s strategy, without weakening their
position in future negotiations.
Assumption 2 (The buyer has complete knowledge of the seller’s strategy). Another
implication of buyer anonymity is that buyers may have the opportunity to probe the
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seller until they can deduce the seller’s strategy. Even if buyers are not completely
anonymous, buyers may pool their information to determine a seller’s strategy. Once
a seller’s strategy is determined, it may be posted to a server where it may be publicly
accessible (or accessible to those participating in some sort of buyers’ consortium)
and available to future buyers. We can imagine systems that would allow buyers to
automate the process of checking servers for sellers’ strategies before engaging in a
negotiation. Thus we assume that buyers have complete knowledge of the seller’s
strategy.
Assumption 3 (There are no transaction costs for buyer or seller). Because online
negotiations may be completely automated and occur quickly with minimal consump-
tion of resources (and any consumption that occurs is likely to involve resources that
would otherwise be idle and for which there are no per-minute, or per-use fees), they
may be said to be free of transaction costs.
The seller’s goal is to maximize expected revenue per arriving buyer bi. Intu-
itively, a single fixed price is the best a seller can do because, under any other strategy,
the buyer may restart the negotiation as many times as necessary to elicit the seller’s
best offer. Because the seller’s strategy is common knowledge, the buyer is aware of
what the seller’s lowest price is, and what strategy she must use to obtain it. Thus,
for any seller strategy, the buyer can select the appropriate strategy so as to reach an
agreement at the seller’s lowest price. Hence, the seller can do no better than to offer
that price right away as a take-it-or-leave-it offer.
The seller cannot take advantage of any historic knowledge of the buyer, and it
cannot make a credible threat of cutting off negotiation with a buyer if an offer is not
accepted after a certain amount of time. In addition, the seller cannot take advantage
of any desire on the part of the buyer to reach a quick agreement in order to avoid
excessive transaction costs.
The seller may be able to price discriminate among buyer types by planning
different strategies for different negotiation sessions. For example, suppose the seller
adopts a strategy SN that demands a price 2; SN+1 demands 3 with probability 0.8
and demands 1 with probability 0.2; finally, SN+2 and beyond all demand a price of 3.
A buyer who has a reservation value of 2.5 will pay the price 2 immediately. A buyer
who has a reservation value of 1.5 will refuse and restart the negotiation, hoping to
get a chance to purchase at price 1 in session N + 1.
While such price discrimination strategies may work in the short run, they are not
effective in steady state. In order for a buyer to accept a price right away when a lower
price might be offered in a future round, not only must the lower price be unlikely,
but it must be unlikely that even the current price will be available again. Thus, the
seller’s usual “best offer” must be continually rising in order for price discrimination to
work. In steady state, the amount of profit that can be gained from this is vanishingly
small.
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Trading data rather than money. The result holds even if the unit of trade is data
rather than money, as modeled by the introduction of buyer utility functions on the
unit of trade. Even if buyers have a small valuation for their personal data they will
always hold out for a better price (revelation of less data) if they can do so without
cost to themselves.
3.1.1. Case 1a: No anonymous return
We now relax the assumption that buyers are anonymous and assume instead that
buyers cannot change their identifiers in the short run, though they may be able to do
so in the long run. Thus, a buyer cannot end a negotiation and immediately return
under a new pseudonym, although the buyer may return under a new pseudonym after
some amount of time has passed. While sellers may carry out threats to discontinue
negotiation with a buyer, sellers are not able to establish long-term profiles of individual
buyers, nor are they able to share profiles among sellers. In short, a seller can make
inferences about the buyer’s type or strategy only from the progress of the current
negotiation session.
This situation may occur when sellers identify buyers by their IP addresses.
Buyers who dial into an Internet Service Provider (ISP) to access the Internet may
receive a different IP address every time they dial in. The IP address can be thought
of as a pseudonym for the buyer that exists throughout a particular online session.
However, when the buyer disconnects from the ISP and dials in again, a new session
is established with a new pseudonym. This situation may also occur when a seller
leaves a cookie on a buyer’s machine that the buyer periodically deletes.
As with the base case, the optimal seller strategy in this situation is a fixed-
price strategy. Riley and Zeckhauser [10] analyze this bargaining problem. In their
model, sellers can adopt and commit to strategies that, with some probability, cut
off negotiation with the buyer. In order to make such a threat practicable, the seller
must be able to identify the buyer should the buyer try to return immediately. This
is possible under our assumption of “no anonymous return”. Thus, buyers who do not
accept a seller’s offer risk losing the ability to reach any agreement. The seller can
parlay this threat into successful price discrimination. Buyers for whom the value of
reaching an agreement is low will be more willing to risk not reaching an agreement
than those for whom the value of reaching an agreement is high.
Even though price discrimination is possible in this model, Riley and Zeckhauser
prove that it is never more profitable for the seller than all fixed-price strategies. The
lost value from carrying out the threat of cutting off some buyers more than offsets the
added value from charging higher prices to some of the buyers. While it is not easy to
summarize their proof, we offer a proof for a more restricted case that provides some
insights about why the result holds.
Proposition 1. Assume that buyers have full knowledge of the seller’s strategy and no
transaction costs, and sellers cannot take advantage of any historic information about
a buyer obtained during previous online sessions, but can identify buyers who end
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a negotiation and immediately return. Suppose that a seller with reservation price s
faces, with probability q, a buyer with reservation value v1 and, with probability 1−q,
a buyer with reservation value v2. No seller strategy is more profitable than every
take-it-or-leave-it strategy.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume v2 < v1. Here, we need concern ourselves
only with a strategy for a single negotiating session since if a buyer returns, the seller
can recognize the buyer and continue the previous negotiating session. Suppose there
is an optimal strategy S that is more profitable than any take-it-or-leave-it strategy.
If the first offer of S is randomized, pick one of the possible offers, call it x1, that
yields maximum expected profit to the seller. Without loss of generality, assume that
at least one player type accepts the initial offer (else consider the equivalent strategy
that begins with the second round after the offer of x1 is rejected). If both player
types accept x1, the strategy is equivalent to one where the initial offer is made on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis. Hence, x1 must be accepted by one player type and not the
other.
After the first round, S has some probability p of making a deal with players of
the other type, and some average price x2 when a deal is made. Thus, S has the same
profit as a strategy where the seller in round 2 offers a price x2 with probability p and,
with probability 1−p cuts off negotiation with the buyer. We must have x2 < x1, else
no player would reject x1 in the first round in order to have the chance of paying x2 in
the second. Clearly, it is the higher-valued player type that accepts the first round-offer,
since if the higher price is the best option for the low-valued player type it certainly
will be for the higher-valued type. To sell to the lower valued buyer, the second round
price x2 must be no higher than v2, and to maximize profits, the seller might as well
set x2 = v2.
In summary, we restrict our attention to strategies that offer an initial price x1,
and a lower price x2 = v2, with probability p, in the second round. The high-valued
buyers accept the higher price immediately while the low-valued buyers reject the
initial price and accept the lower price if it is made in the second round.
Figure 1 shows the potential profit regions for both buyers and sellers. Low-
valued buyers never gain any profit, since the price x2 is set at their reservation
value v2. A high-valued buyer gains v1 − x1 with probability 1 from buying in the
first round, so the profit is regions A and B. If she waits until the second round, then
with probability p, the gain is v1−x2 (regions A and C). The seller gains x1− s from
selling at price x1 (regions C, D, E, and F). If the game goes to the second round, the
seller gains x2− s with probability p (region E). So long as the price x2 > s, we can,
without loss of generality, assume s = 0, which will simplify some of the equations.
Intuitively, the proof proceeds as follows. In order for price discrimination to
be better than offering everyone the lower price v2, the seller needs x2 (and, hence,
v2) to be much lower than x1, so that the extra possibility of getting regions C and D
from the high-valued buyers outweighs the losses from not collecting region F from
the low-valued buyers. But in order for price discrimination to be better than offering
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Figure 1. Buyer and seller profit regions when anonymous return is impossible.
only the higher price v1, the seller needs x2 to be close to x1, so that the addition of
region E from low-valued buyers more than makes up for the loss of A and B from
high-valued buyers. No matter how the seller chooses x1 and p, it is impossible to
successfully price discriminate and make more money than is possible with the take-
it-or-leave-it prices v1 and v2. The remainder of the proof fills in the details of this
argument.
In order to induce high-value players to pay the higher price x1, sellers must
select values for x1 and x2 that satisfy the following constraint:
v1 − x1 > (v1 − x2)p, > . (1)
High-valued buyer prefers high price in first round over waiting.
Simplifying, we get:
(v1 − x1)(1− p) > (x1 − v2)p, > . (1a)
It is clearly possible to select values for x1 and x2 in which this is true, indicating
that the seller can price discriminate among the two buyer types, at least for some
values of v1 and v2.
Now consider whether it is profitable for the seller to price discriminate in this
fashion. In particular, when is the price discrimination strategy more profitable than the
two single-price strategies of v1, selling only to the high-valued buyers, and v2, selling
to all buyers at a somewhat lower price? For price discrimination to be profitable, the
following constraints must hold:
qx1 + (1− q)v2p > qv1, q + (1− q) > q . (2)
Mixed strategy more profitable than single price v1.
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qx1 + (1− q)v2p > v2, q + (1− q) > . (3)
Mixed strategy more profitable than single price v2.
Simplifying, we get:
(1− q)v2p > q(v1 − x1), (1− q) > q , (2a)
q(x1 − v2) > (1− q)v2(1− p), q > (1− q) . (3a)
Substituting constraint (1) into (2a), we get
(1− q)v2p > q(v1 − x1) > q(v1 − v2)p, (1− q) > q > q . (2b)
Substituting constraint (1a) into (3a), we get:
(1− q)v2(1− p) 6 q(x1 − v2) (1− q) 6 q
= q
[














= q(v1 − v2)(1 − p), = q .
(3b)
In order to make (2b) and (3b) comparable, we divide (2b) through by p, and (3b) by
(1− p).
(1− q)v2 > q(v1 − v2), (1− q) > q , (2c)
(1− q)v2 6 q(v1 − v2), (1− q) 6 q . (3c)
All of the inequalities must be binding in order to satisfy both (2c) and (3c). If
price discrimination is at least as profitable as the take-it-or-leave-it offers of v1 and
v2, then, in fact, all three strategies must yield exactly the same profit. Thus, the seller
cannot improve on a single take-it-or-leave-it strategy. 
Trading data rather than money. Proposition 1 holds even if the unit of trade is data
rather than money, as modeled by the introduction of buyer utility functions on the
unit of trade. Only equation (1) is different, becoming u1(v1−x1) > u1(v1−x2)p. But
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since the utility function is linear, this just reduces to the constraint from the original
equation (1).
3.1.2. Case 1b: Seller has perfect knowledge of buyer type
Next, we consider a situation with even less buyer anonymity. Here, a player
has one identity for all time, allowing sellers to accumulate long-term profiles and to
share their information about buyer types with other sellers. Hence, the seller begins
the negotiation with full information about the buyer’s type.
This case may occur when buyers have fixed IP addresses, for example, buyers
who have direct Internet connections (as opposed to dial-up connections). It may also
occur when buyers routinely provide personally-identifying information to the Web
sites they visit.
Proposition 2. When buyers have full knowledge of the seller’s strategy and no trans-
action costs, and sellers have perfect knowledge about each buyer’s type, the optimal
strategy for the seller is a take-it-or-leave-it offer.
Because the seller knows the buyer’s type, the seller knows the set of offers that
the buyer will accept. Thus, the seller can engage in perfect price discrimination,
offering a different take-it-or-leave-it offer to each buyer, where the offer is the most
favorable to the seller among all those that the buyer would accept. It will then be
an equilibrium for the buyer to accept the offer. Of course, since the buyer also has
perfect knowledge of the seller, there are many other equilibria, including one where
the buyer refuses to pay more than the seller’s reservation price.
If the seller-optimal equilibrium is the one that is normally arrived at, buyers
may adjust their behavior in anticipation that any information they reveal could be
used against them in later negotiations. For example, a buyer who might prefer to
accept an offer in the current game if it stood on its own may reject the offer because
to accept it would cause future offers from other sellers to be higher. Whatever type
the buyer chooses to portray herself as, however, the buyer will have an incentive to
continue to behave as if she has that type. From the sellers’ perspective, then, the
buyer really is of the type that she pretends to be, and the seller’s optimal strategy is
still to offer the reservation price of that buyer type as a take-it-or-leave-it offer.
3.2. Case 2: Limited knowledge of seller strategy
Proposition 3. When buyers have full anonymity and no transaction costs (but only
limited knowledge of seller strategy), the optimal strategy for the seller is a take-it-or-
leave-it offer.
In this case we relax the assumption that the buyer begins with complete knowl-
edge of the seller’s strategy. This would occur when there are no buyers’ clubs or
servers where sellers’ strategies are posted. However, even if we relax this assump-
tion, the other two assumptions imply that the buyer can acquire such knowledge
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at no cost. That is, the buyer can probe the seller by conducting a negotiation but
then breaking it off before reaching an agreement. The buyer can then return, under
a different pseudonym, and conduct another negotiation to further probe the seller’s
strategy. Thus, the ability to be anonymous and interact without transaction costs are
sufficient to give the buyer as good a knowledge of the seller’s strategy as is desired.
The argument from the base case, then, implies that the seller can do no better than to
use a fixed-price strategy, making a take-it-or-leave-it offer in the first round.
3.3. Case 3: Transaction costs
We return now to the assumptions of anonymous buyers who have perfect knowl-
edge of the sellers’ strategies. We consider, however, a situation where there are some
transaction costs, which we can model either as a fixed cost for each round of bar-
gaining, or a time discount factor on the value of the agreement. This corresponds to
a situation of the Web browser negotiating with a Web site while the human buyer
waits. A fixed cost per round of bargaining seems somewhat more realistic in this
case: the total delay will usually not be significant enough to change the value of the
interaction between buyer and Web site, but there is an opportunity cost to the lost
time the person spends waiting. If the seller has a way to exploit the delay costs for the
purposes of price discrimination, the seller can insert artificial delays to drive up those
costs, even when they would otherwise be negligible. We consider two possibilities,
one in which all people have the same opportunity cost for time, so that transaction
costs are uniform, and another in which people exhibit varying levels of patience.
3.3.1. Case 3a: Uniform transaction costs
Suppose that delay costs are uniform among all buyers. Analogous to the “no
anonymous return” scenario, some price discrimination is possible. Here, the seller
cannot use the threat of cutting a buyer off completely (an action that would have
variable cost to buyers with different values), because a buyer can return under a
different pseudonym. Instead, the seller can threaten to delay, imposing a cost k per
round of delay on the buyer. Faced with an offer from the seller, a buyer can accept
it, wait for the next offer, drop out of the game, or return anonymously to restart the
negotiation. There is no variability in the actual cost of delay among buyers, which on
first analysis suggests that the seller cannot use delay as a means of price discrimination.
There may, however, be variability in the lost revenue to a buyer from not making a
deal in the first round: a high value buyer may lose a sure deal by waiting, while a
low value buyer only forgoes a deal that he would not have accepted in any case. This
opens an opportunity for price discrimination, if the seller’s strategy is to offer a lower
price in a later round with probability less than 1. As in the earlier scenario, however,
we provide a proof that with two buyer types there is no way to make a simple price
discrimination strategy more profitable than all the take-it-or-leave-it strategies. We
conjecture but have not yet been able to prove that this result holds for any number
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of buyer types, and more complex price discrimination strategies involving more than
two rounds.
Proposition 4. Assume that buyers have full anonymity, full knowledge of the seller’s
strategy, and uniform transaction costs. Suppose that a seller with reservation price s
faces, with probability q, a buyer with reservation value v1 and, with probability 1−q,
a buyer with reservation value v2. Consider strategies where the seller offers a price x1
in the first round, with probability p offers x2 in the second round and otherwise always
offers x1. Moreover, assume that the strategy is restarted for each negotiating session,
so that a buyer can end a negotiating session and return anonymously to face the same
negotiating strategy. No such strategy is more profitable than every take-it-or-leave-it
offer.
Proof. Assume that there exists a price discrimination strategy more profitable than
any take-it-or-leave-it strategy. As in the proof of proposition 2, we can assume without
loss of generality that this strategy induces high-valued players to pay x1 immediately
but lower valued players stay in the game until the next round, accepting the lower
price x2 if it is offered. There are two possibilities to consider if the lower price is
not offered in the second round:
A. The low-valued player returns anonymously and waits through the first round, in
the hopes of obtaining a lower price. If this is the case, the seller will eventually
sell to all buyers and all players of type 2 will pay x2, although some will wait
longer than others before getting that offer. As we shall see below, however, the
only prices that could induce this behavior have v2 > x1, which means that the
seller could sell more profitably to all player types at the single take-it-or-leave-it
price v2.
B. The low-valued player drops out if the lower price is not offered. If this is the
case, the proof proceeds analogously to that for proposition 2 and a contradiction
is derived.
Proof for case A: Anonymous return for low-valued players if x2 not offered in
round 2. Let z be the expected value to players of type 2 from participating. There
is always a delay cost of k since the player rejects the initial offer of x1 and continues
to the second round. Then, profit v2 − x2 is available with probability p. With proba-
bility 1− p, the player will have to incur another delay cost k to return anonymously
and restart the negotiation, which yields an expected profit z. Thus, z satisfies the
following recurrence equation:
z = −k + p(v2 − x2) + (1− p)(−k + z) (4a)
which simplifies to
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In other words, players of type 2 will always pay x2 if they wait long enough, and
the expected delay cost from waiting is k((2− p)/p). The difference in value between
waiting for the price x2 and taking the offer x1 immediately is











Similarly, let y be the value that high-valued buyers could get from adopting the same
strategy as low-valued buyers, continually returning anonymously and waiting for an
offer of x2. Following similar reasoning, we get






For high-valued players, the difference in value between waiting for the price x2 and
taking the offer x1 immediately is











The difference in value between accepting x1 and waiting for x2 is the same for both
player types, yet the two types choose different actions, so the difference in value must
be 0, which makes both player types indifferent:




Substituting (4f) into (4b), we find that:
z = v2 − x1. (4g)
But we must have z > k if low-valued buyers incur the delay cost k to return, rather
than dropping out, and hence:
v2 > x1 + k. (4h)
So, in this case, the seller could more profitably employ a take-it-or-leave-it offer of
v2, getting all buyer types to accept immediately.
Proof for case B: Low-valued players drop out if x2 not offered in round 2. Now
consider the case where low-valued players, instead of returning anonymously, drop
out if the lower price is not offered. Figure 2 shows the potential profit regions for
both buyers and sellers in this situation. Low-valued buyers may gain some profit if
v2 − x2 − k > 0. A high valued buyer gains v1 − x1 with probability 1 from buying
in the first round, so the profit is regions A and B. If she waits until the second round,
at a cost of k, then with probability p, the gain is v1 − x2 (regions A, C and E). The
seller gains x1 − s from selling at price x1 (regions C–H). If the game goes to the
second round, the seller gains x2−s with probability p (region E). So long as the price
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Figure 2. Buyer and seller profit regions with uniform buyer delay costs.
x2 > s, we can, without loss of generality, assume s = 0, which will simplify some
of the equations. We will use the labeled regions in figure 2 to illustrate our example
below.
In order to induce the high-valued buyer to pay price x1 immediately, sellers
must select values for x1 and x2 such that
A + B > A + C + E− k. (5a)
In order to induce the low-valued buyer to stay in the game for the second round,
we must have
E− k > 0. (5b)
Combining (5a) and (5b), price discrimination will be possible if and only if
A + B > A + C, or equivalently, B > C. (5c)
If price discrimination is more profitable than charging a fixed price v1, we must
have
q(C + D + E + F + G + H) + (1− q)G > q(A + B + C + D + E + F + G + H). (6a)
Simplifying,
(1− q)G > q(A + B). (6b)
Substituting (5c),
(1− q)G > q(A + C). (6c)
Since E > 0,
(1− q)(E + G) > q(A + C). (6d)
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Finally, dividing through by p,
(1− q)(E + F + G + H) > q(A + B + C + D). (6e)
If price discrimination is more profitable than charging a fixed price v2, we must
have
q(C + D + E + F + G + H) + (1− q)G > E + F + G + H. (7a)
Simplifying,
q(C + D) > (1− q)(E + F + H). (7b)
Substituting (5c),
q(B + D) > (1− q)(E + F + H). (7c)
Since E > 0,
q(B + D) > (1− q)(F + H). (7d)
Finally, dividing through by 1− p,
q(A + B + C + D) > (1− q)(E + F + G + H). (7e)
But (6e) and (7e) together imply that all the inequalities are binding, and thus the
profits from price discrimination at best equal the largest profits from a take-it-or-leave-
it strategy. Intuitively, v2 must be large in order to make price discrimination better
than ignoring the low-valued buyers, but it must be small to make price discrimination
better than selling to everyone at v2. These constraints are in conflict.
Trading data rather than money. Proposition 5 no longer holds if the unit of trade
is data rather than money, as modeled by the introduction of buyer utility functions
on the unit of trade. The natural interpretation of the uniform delay cost is still in
terms of money or utility, and not in terms of data, which is the unit of trade. This
effectively turns the case of uniform transaction costs into that of variable transaction
costs. The cost of delay, when expressed in the same units as those used for trades,
varies between buyers. As we shall see in the next section, the seller can sometimes
profitably price discriminate when transaction costs are variable. For example, suppose
that one player type cares very little about releasing personal data but that the other
type cares somewhat more. If the seller offers to complete the transaction immediately
with a large transfer of data, or in the next round for a smaller transfer, low-privacy
buyers will accept the immediate offer while high-privacy buyers will wait. Even
though the transaction cost for both player types is the same, the amount of value
gained by transferring less data is variable and that is sufficient to enable profitable
price discrimination.
3.3.2. Case 3b: Variable transaction costs
If transaction costs vary among buyers, sellers again have an opportunity to price
discriminate, offering a higher price in early rounds and a lower price in later rounds
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to induce buyers with higher transaction costs to pay a higher price. Here, however,
the seller has more latitude in its price discrimination than before, and can, in some
cases, do so profitably.
Proposition 5. When buyers have full anonymity, full knowledge of the seller’s strat-
egy, and variable transaction costs, the seller can sometimes price discriminate suc-
cessfully.
Expanding on the simple example above, suppose the low-valued player has
delay costs k2, while the high-valued player has delay costs k1, and k2 < k1. The
seller can price discriminate with a pure strategy. The seller offers a price x1, with
v2 < x1 < v1 in the first round and commits to offering the price x2 in the second
round, with x2 +k2 < v2. In figure 2, this would be like setting p = 1, so that only the
left column of the profit regions are relevant (the areas of regions B, D, F, and H are
all 0). Like the scenario with uniform delay costs, the high-valued buyer can gain at
least as much as the low-valued buyer by waiting until the second round. But here the
high-valued buyer loses more in transaction costs than the lower-valued buyer does.
To induce the high-valued buyer to pay the high price, we must have
v1 − x1 > v1 − x2 − k1, or, equivalently, x1 6 x2 + k1. (8)
To induce the low-valued buyer to stay in the game, we must have
v2 − x2 > k2, or, equivalently, x2 6 v2 − k2. (9)
The seller’s best strategy will be to choose x1 and x2 as large as possible, subject to
these constraints, that is,
x2 = v2 − k2, and (8a)
x1 = x2 + k1 = v2 − k2 + k1. (9a)
For the price discrimination strategy to be more profitable for the seller than the fixed
price v1, we must have
qx1 + (1− q)x2 > qv1. (10a)
Simplifying,
(1− q)x2 > q(v1 − x1). (10b)
Substituting (8a) and (9a),
(1− q)(v2 − k2) > q(v1 − v2 + k2 − k1). (10c)
Simplifying,
v2 − k2 > q(v1 − k1). (10d)
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In other words, the second buyer type’s value must be enough larger than its delay
cost, so that the second round price can be high enough to make up for the opportunity
cost of a first-round price x1 that is less than v1. The higher the probability of a high-
valued buyer, and the greater the spread between the high-valued buyer’s value and
delay cost, the greater must be the spread between the low-valued buyer’s value and
and delay cost. If the delay costs are negligible in comparison to the buyers’ values,
(10d) simplifies to v2 > qv1; v2 must be closer to v1 the greater the probability of a
high-valued buyer.
For the price discrimination strategy to be more profitable for the seller than the
fixed price v2, we must have
qx1 + (1− q)x2 > v2. (11a)
Simplifying,
q(x1 − x2) > v2 − x2. (11b)
Substituting (8a) and (9a),
qk1 > k2. (11c)
In other words, k1 must be enough larger than k2, and the smaller the probability
of a high-valued buyer, the larger k1 must be. While (10d) and (11c) will not always
hold, when they do, the seller can derive greater profit from the price-discrimination
strategy than from any single-price strategy.
Perhaps surprisingly, it is possible for the buyers as well as the sellers to benefit
from the seller’s price discrimination, because it may allow the seller to “open new
markets” [4]. When the seller employs only single-price strategies, the seller chooses
the price as a monopolist would, missing the opportunity for trade with some low-
valued buyers in order to maintain a higher price for the high-valued buyers. A price
discrimination strategy can reduce that deadweight loss. Usually, a monopolist who can
price discriminate captures all the additional surplus and indeed takes away whatever
consumer surplus would otherwise exist, so that buyers, both individually and as a
group, fare worse under price discrimination. In this case, however, in order to practice
price discrimination, the monopolist may need to offer some of the deadweight savings
to some of the buyers. While this does not happen when there are only two buyer
types, the following example with three buyer types illustrates the possibility.
Suppose there are three buyer types. Table 1 shows the reservation values and
transaction costs for each buyer type. The last column shows the probability that the
seller will face each type of buyer.
If the seller can only consider single-price strategies, the optimal price is 100.
The lower-valued buyer types are so infrequent that the lost revenue from offering a
lower price to attract them will outweigh any additional profits from selling to them.
Consider, however, a seller strategy of offering to sell at a price 100 in the first
round, 58 in the second round, or 28 in the third round. The high-valued buyers will
still buy at the high price, the middle-valued buyers at the middle price, and the low-
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Table 1
Reservation values and transaction costs.




valued buyers at the low price. The seller, however, cannot capture the entire surplus
from the middle-valued buyer. The third round price cannot be larger than 28 while
still retaining participation of the lowest-valued buyers, since such buyers have to pay
transaction costs of 2 to wait until the third round. The difference between the second
and third round prices cannot be more than 30, else the middle-valued buyers would
choose to wait until the third round; hence the second round price cannot be more
than 58. A middle-valued buyer has a value of 90, and loses 30 by waiting one round,
leaving a surplus of 2 for such a buyer. Compared to the single-price strategy of 100
for all buyers, no buyers are worse off, and middle-valued buyers are better off.
4. Related work
Osborne and Rubinstein [8] and Wang [13] consider related negotiation scenarios
that offer useful analogies and insights but are not directly applicable because they
do not consider the effects of buyer anonymity or buyers sharing with each other
knowledge of seller strategies. Osborne and Rubenstein introduce seller delay costs in
addition to the buyer delay costs. We can interpret these delay costs as computational
and operational costs of running the Web server. In their models, buyers have identical
valuations, so that the negotiation can be viewed simply as bargaining over the division
of the known surplus from trade.
Given buyer and seller delay costs, some strategies are not credible (e.g., it may
not be credible for a seller to threaten to reject certain offers, when it is clear that
the seller would lose money by waiting until the next round to continue negotiation).
Osborne and Rubinstein restrict their attention to subgame perfect equilibria, those
where both seller and buyer strategies are credible in all the possible subgames, even
those subgames that are not reached in the equilibrium negotiation. They find that if
the buyer and seller know each other’s delay costs, and the set of possible offers is
connected (that is, if prices of $2 and $4 are possible, then so is $3), the only subgame
perfect equilibrium has the buyer accepting the seller’s first offer (section 3.8).
In some other circumstances, however, there are subgame perfect equilibria that
involve agreement later than the first round. For example, if the set of allowable offers
is disconnected, there can be equilibria where the early actions effectively signal a
player’s bargaining toughness and a player who prematurely suggests a compromise
in the first round will be forced to accept an extreme outcome (section 3.10). In
those cases, the absence of available intermediate offers makes it possible to enforce
the extreme outcome. They also consider situations where the seller has imperfect
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knowledge of the buyer’s delay costs (chapter 5) and find that, analogous to our
scenario 3b, the seller can price discriminate by selling at different prices in different
rounds of the bargaining.
Negotiation protocol design is a close relative of mechanism design. Any equilib-
rium of bargaining under a particular negotiation protocol is also the outcome of some
incentive-compatible mechanism.4 The Revelation Principle5 states that any outcome
of an incentive-compatible mechanism can be achieved as the outcome of a direct
mechanism, in which players do best by honestly reporting their types and an outcome
is computed as a function of the set of types. Here, however, we are interested not
merely in the set of equilibrium outcomes, but in features of the bargaining process,
specifically whether multiple rounds are useful.
5. Discussion
We have identified three assumptions – anonymous buyers, perfect knowledge
of seller strategies, and no transaction costs – that may sometimes hold in automated
negotiations between Web sites and user agents, and analyzed several cases in which
these assumptions hold in various combinations. While we have certainly not done an
exhaustive analysis of every combination of assumptions, our limited analyses suggest
some guidelines for the development of automated negotiation protocols.
For protocols designed to be used in situations where all three of our assump-
tions are likely to hold or where only the anonymity or knowledge assumptions are
individually relaxed, designers should consider using restricted protocols that require
sellers to make take-it-or-leave-it offers in the first round. In these cases, it is op-
timal for rational sellers who encounter rational buyers to make take-it-or-leave-it
offers. By employing a restricted protocol, the optimal outcome may be reached,
even when one of the players does not behave rationally. Thus it is not neces-
sary to develop strategies that attempt to account for irrational players (an inherently
difficult problem). Moreover, the overall implementation of the protocol is simpli-
fied.
One possible drawback of using a restricted protocol in the cases where take-it-
or-leave-it offers are optimal is that sellers may not be able to learn as much from
each prospective buyer during the learning phase (where sellers determine the distri-
bution of buyer types in the population and decide where to set their prices). For
some applications, building in a facility for prospective buyers to signal a seller about
their type after they have turned down a seller’s offer can allay this concern. For
example, in a privacy negotiation protocol such as P3P, a seller might advertise that
they require buyers to give them several pieces of personal information, which they
4 If the corresponding mechanism were not incentive compatible, then, in the bargaining game, there is
a player type that would pretend to be another type, thus ruining the equilibrium (cf. Osborne and
Rubenstein [8, section 5.6]).
5 See explanation in [12].
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will use for a stated purpose. A buyer who refuses this offer might send a message to
the seller explaining which piece of information or which part of the information use
is objectionable. Further work should be done to model the benefits of such a signal
to each party.
For protocols designed to be used in situations where there are transaction costs
or where more than one of our other assumptions do not hold, it is not always optimal
for the seller to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. In these cases the protocol should
probably allow for multiple rounds of negotiation. However, to gain some of the
simplicity advantages of the restricted protocols, multi-round negotiation protocols
should include a facility for sellers to make binding take-it-or-leave-it offers that are
enforced by the protocol. Note that the ability to commit to take-it-or-leave-it offers
does not confer any advantage on sellers that they did not already have, since they could
pursue any strategy consistently and buyers would eventually learn of this consistency.6
The main advantage of the ability to commit is that it will make it unnecessary for
buyers to repeatedly probe sellers or consult with a buyers’ club to determine that a
seller will not change its offer.
Further work should be done to examine the cases where price discrimination
through multi-round negotiation is an optimal seller strategy. If such cases are rare
or difficult to identify, designers might consider using a restricted protocol; the lost
opportunities for sellers caused by this restriction are likely to be outweighed by losses
caused by irrational behavior that might otherwise result.
In cases where price discrimination may be an optimal strategy for sellers, it is
also important to examine the consequences for buyers. For protocols such as P3P
that are being designed with consumer protection in mind, if price discrimination does
not produce an overall benefit for buyers, it might be desirable to force sellers to make
a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Somewhat surprisingly, however, as we showed in case 3b,
there may be some situations where price discrimination can benefit the buyers.
In cases where a fixed-price strategy is optimal for sellers, giving buyers the
option of engaging in a multi-round protocol cannot benefit them. If a seller selects
a fixed-price strategy, it would be irrational for them to accept any other offer from a
buyer, even if such an offer was permitted, assuming that sellers do not pay any delay
costs.
Another avenue for future research is to analyze when it may be in the interests
of certain buyers to reveal their identities, despite the fact that anonymous interaction
is possible. For example, buyers of certain types may wish to aid sellers in price
discrimination if those buyers would not otherwise fare well in the seller’s optimal
one-price strategy.
6 Unlike the single negotiation session model of Osborne and Rubenstein, we do not preclude strategies
that are irrational in subgames of the current negotiation session, because pursuing such a strategy in
that subgame may have reputational effects among buyers for future negotiation sessions.
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6. Conclusion
Our analysis introduces interesting new twists to the study of negotiation pro-
tocols, based on the negligible transaction costs in automated negotiations and the
asymmetry between buyers and sellers in Web-based negotiations. Sellers have fixed
identities, permitting buyers to share knowledge of seller strategies; and buyers can be
anonymous, foiling seller attempts to learn about particular buyers’ strategies. These
conditions give buyers significant bargaining power, so that, even if sellers have no
transaction costs, they cannot profitably price discriminate. We expect that future re-
search on negotiation and other mechanism design problems under varying conditions
of anonymity and reputation sharing will prove fruitful.
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